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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS DASKALAS, THE PAWN SHOP & PENTELAKIS
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant tc
the

provisions

of

§§

3

and

5,

Article

VIII

of

the

Utah

Constitution; §78-2-2 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (1987 Supp.), and Rule 3
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The
Pentelakis

Appellants/Defendants
will

be

referred

to

Daskalas, The

Pawn

herein

"tenants"; the

as

the

Shop

and

Respondents/Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows will be referred
to

herein

as

the

"owners";

and,

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City will be referred to herein
as the "Plaintiff".

"TR" refers to Transcript of Record. "R"

refers to Record, and "Ex." refers to Exhibit.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain involving a tract of
land situate in Block 57, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Countyf State
of Utah, generally identified as properties located at 64 and 66
East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Prior to the commencement of the jury trial in this cause,
the trial

judge ruled, as a matter of law, that the tenants'

interests and rights in the subject properties had been terminated
by the filing

of the Complaint

and

that said tenants had no

compensable interest, except as to the value of any "improvements"
made by them.

In view of the fact that the tenants considered such

"improvements" to be of minimal value, if any, they did not elect
to participate in the trial on the issue of damages to prove the
"bonus value" of their leasehold interests which they
existed on the date of taking.

contended

The case then proceeded to trial as

between the Plaintiff and other designated Defendants.
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The trial court subsequently made an award of attorney's
fees in favor of the owners and against the tenants based upon the
claim or contention that the owners had been required to pursue a
determination of the rights of the tenants to share in the award.
It is these rulings which we believe to be erroneous, and as suchf
constituted prejudicial error and thus give rise to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling, as a

matter of law, that the filing of the condemnation action by the
Plaintiff

served

to

terminate

the

leasehold

interests

of the

tenants, and thus deprived the tenants of the right to a full
evidentiary trial on the issue of damages and just compensation.
2.

Whether any claim for attorney's fees may remain after

the lease has been terminated and is no longer in effect, and if
so, whether the award of attorney's fees is reasonable and proper
under the

pleadings and circumstances and adequately supported by

the record.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1985, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
City

filed

a

Complaint

wherein

the

owners

and

tenants

were

designated as parties defendant, which action sought to acquire by
eminent domain all of the right, title, interest, and estate of
said parties in the premises at 64 and 66 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R. 2-33)

On the date of service of Summons and

issuance of Complaint, June, 1985, the tenants were in possession
of the said premises pursuant to separate written lease agreements,
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copies of which are in the Addendum hereto marked as Exhibit "A"
and Exhibit

"B" and by reference are made a part hereof, (R.

345-362) (TR. 69-73)
On
Occupancy

August
was

1,

filed

1985f
by

the

a

Motion
Plaintiff

for

Order

seeking

of

Immediate

the

immediate

occupancy and possession of the total tracts. (R. 38-40)

Counsel

for the tenants executed a Stipulation consenting to the occupancy
of said premises so far as their interests were concerned. (R.
71-75)

However, the ownersf by and through their counsel, filed an

Answer to the Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy objecting to
the granting thereof, raising various issues relative to the need,
necessity, and right of condemnation. (R. 218-225)

Alsof said

owners filed an Answer to the Complaint challenging the rights of
the Plaintiff to acquire said property putting at issue the essence
of the litigation, i.e. could the property in fact be acquired
through the proceedings instituted by the Plaintiff. (R. 226-229)
On August 16, 1985, an Order of Immediate Occupancy was
entered by the Court which was conditional in nature, (R. 231-239),
and the terms of which were objected to by counsel for the tenants
for failure to give proper notice. (R. 243-244)

In any event, the

conditions set forth in the Order of Immediate Occupancy failed to
develop or otherwise occur and the matter proceeded to trial as
though no Order of Immediate Occupancy had been entered.

The

tenants filed an Answer to the Complaint of the Plaintiff and put
at issue the questions of just compensation and damages to be
awarded. (R. 246-250)

The objection to the Order of Immediate
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Occupancy

was never resolved nor was any ruling made thereon by

the trial Court,
At no time did the owners ever file any cross claim against
the tenants.

On the 25th day of October, 1985, owners filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a ruling from the Court to the
effect that the tenants were not entitled to share or otherwise
participate in the award of any damages recovered in said cause.
(R. 272-284)

The tenants resisted said Motion, and the parties

submitted memoranda of authority in support of their respective
positions,

together

with

proffered

evidence

and

testimony.

Subsequent thereto, the trial court refused to make any findings of
fact but entered Conclusions of Law and Judgment decreeing that the
tenants had no compensable interest in the property or proceeds of
the verdict, (R. 532-553), or any award of damages other than what
may be proven as value of "improvements" made by them, and awarded
attorney's fees to the owners and against the tenants upon the
theory that they had incurred such attorney's fees in defending the
claims of the tenants to share in the compensation and damages
involved herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The tenants had a vested and subsisting property right in
the subject premises on the date of "taking" and were entitled to
present evidence and testimony in support of their claim that their
respective leasehold interests had a "bonus value", and as such,
they were entitled to participate in the trial to show the nature
and extent of damages and right to participate in any award made by
the jury.
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Notwithstanding the filing of the Complaint, no absolute
and final Order of Immediate Occupancy was ever granted prior to
trial, the owners continued to receive and collect rent from the
tenants throughout the entire period prior to trial, and no attempt
was made

to give notice or otherwise

interests

until

counsel

for

terminate

the leasehold

the owners delivered

a Notice of

Termination on the 31st day of January, 1987, 23 days prior to
trial. (TR. 68-84) (Ex. 8)
The tenants had a constitutional and statutory compensable
interest and were entitled to go to trial on that issue, and as
such, the court committed prejudicial error in denying the tenants
such rights and no legal or other basis exists for the awarding of
attorney's fees in favor of the owners and against the tenants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TENANTS POSSESSED SUCH AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
PREMISES AS WOULD HAVE ENTITLED THEM TO GO TO TRIAL ON
THE ISSUE OF JUST COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES AND
PRESENT EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY TO SHOW THEY WERE
ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE AWARD OF ANY SUCH RECOVERY.
Compensation

for property

taken or damaged

through the

exercise of the power of eminent domain is mandated pursuant to the
provisions of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Art. I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, and the manner in
which such compensation and damages are to be assessed is provided
under the provisions of 78-34-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.
78-34-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides:
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"All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an
interest inf any of the property described in the
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though
not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in respect to
his own property or interest, or that claimed by him, in
the same manner as if named in the complaint."
78-34-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides in
part as follows:
"The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence
as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings,
and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
"(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and
all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of
each and every separate estate or interest therein; and if
it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel
and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed.
»•*

*

*

*

•
«*

*

*

*

»«*

*

*

*

"(5) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed
for each source of damages separately."
Clearly, under the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions, a tenant in possession of property and claiming an
interest therein on the date of condemnation is an essential party
to any such action if the condemning authority is to acquire a
clear and unencumbered title to the premises by means of the power
of eminent domain.

Whether or not a tenant in possession on the

date of condemnation

possess a compensable

interest becomes a

critical issue to be determined in the process of litigation.
The tenants in this instance entered into separate written
leasehold agreements with the owners on the 1st day of August,
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1981, (Exhibits "A" and "B", Addendum), for an initial leasehold
period of five years.

On the date the Complaint was filed and

service of process effected, said leases still had approximately 13
months

of

unexpired

term

and

additional five-year term.

were

subject

to renewal

for an

Notwithstanding the initiation of the

eminent domain proceedings, the owners resisted the entry of an
Order of Immediate Occupancy, challenging the authority of the
condemning agency to acquire the properties in question and refused
to accept a tender of the statutory deposit without imposition of
other conditions which were never agreed upon or effectually came
to pass.

Furthermore, the owners continued to treat said leasehold

interests

as

being

viable,

receiving

and

collecting

subsisting,

and

operable

the rents on a continuing

leases,

basis and

exercising full dominion and control over the premises as lessor
under the existing lease agreements until the trial which took
place on February 23-25, 1987.
Given this background and the fact that the entire matter
seemed to be in a state of limbo with reference to the ultimate
condemnation of said property, and no final Order of Immediate
Occupancy had issued, (see:

Statement of Facts in brief filed by

Plaintiff herein), the tenants, pursuant to the provisions of each
lease, gave written notice to the owners of their intention to
renew

said

lease

agreements

and having

response or reply thereto, continued

failed

to receive any

in the possession of said

premises, continued to make the necessary rental payments which
were accepted by the owners, and in all respects continued to
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perform under the terms of the lease agreements as though the same
had in fact been extended for an additional five-year period. (TR.
68-84) (Ex. Dl, D2, D3, D4, and D5)

Consequently, the tenants

considered said leases to be valid and subsisting and were prepared
to go to trial on the issue of damages and just compensation having
alleged that they were entitled to share in the compensation and
damages to be awarded.
It is significant to note that the so called condemnation
clause contained in each lease agreement (Page 4, Exhibits "A" and
"B", Addendum) contained the proviso that in the event the property
is taken or acquired via the power of eminent domain "the lease
may, at the election of lessor or lessee, be terminated;" (emphasis
added).

The record will disclose that no notice of election or

other termination was given to either of the tenants until the 31st
day of January, 1987, shortly before trial. (Ex. 8)

Hence it is

the claim and contention of the tenants that said leasehold rights
were

never

terminated,

if

at

all,

prior

to

said

date.

Consequently, the court could not, as a matter of law, conclude
that the mere filing of the action in eminent domain terminated the
leasehold interests of the tenants.
The

authorities

generally

recognize

that

leasehold

interests existing on the date of condemnation give rise to a valid
claim for compensation or damages in the event of a taking or
damaging of such interest.

See Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona,

96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed. 21, where the Court held:
"Ordinarily, a leasehold interest has a compensable value
whenever the capitalized then fair rental value for the

-10-

remaining term of the lease, plus the value of any renewal
right, exceeds the capitalized value of the rental the
lease specifies."
The Court further notes:
"'The measure of damages is the value of the use and
occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder of the
tenant's term, plus the value of the right to renew . . .,
less the agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such
use and occupancy.'" (Citing United States v. Petty Motor
Co., 327 U.S. 381, 66 S.Ct. 601.) 90 L.Ed. 729
In the case of State of Utah, by and through its Road
Commission v. Brown, 531 P2d. 1294, the Supreme Court of this State
held:
"If the lessee is obligated to pay less than the fair
market value of the lease, he sustains a loss when his
interest is taken and the landlord thereby sustains a
gain."
Further recognizing the rule as follows:
"The rule is generally recognized . . . that, where there
are several interests or estates in a parcel of real estate
taken by eminent domain, a proper method of fixing the
value of, or damage to, each interest or estate, is to
determine the value of, or damage to, the property as a
whole, and then to apportion the same among the several
owners according to their respective interests or estates,
rather than to take each interest or estate as a unit and
fix the value thereof or damage thereto separately. . . . "
The

owners

claim

that

by

reason

of

the

condemnation

provisions of each lease, said lease agreements were terminated and
ceased to exist as of the date of the condemnation.
The significant and relevant law on this issue dictates
that by virtue of the law in this State, the date of "taking"
occurs as of the date of service of summons and issuance of
Complaint.

See:

78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and

Siegel v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District, 655 P2d
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662.

On the date of "taking", the respective leasehold interests

were and continued to remain in full force and effect with no
notice having been given by either the lessors or lessees relative
to

the

termination, and

as

a matter

termination had issued prior to the

of

fact, no

notice of

Notice dated January 31, 1987,

which was mailed by counsel for the owners to the tenants.
The law seems well settled that written lease agreements
can be extended for an additional term by the conduct of the
parties after the expiration of the initial term.

See: Ochsner v.

Langendorf, 175 P2d 392, 394 (Colo., 1946), where the Court held:
"By accepting payment of a month's rent after the
expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord makes an
election to treat the party as a tenant from year to year,
upon the same terms as provided in the original lease."
Also, in the case of Standard Parts Company v. D & J Investment
Company, 288 P2d

369, 371

(Okla., 1955), the Court quoted 51

C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, Section 77, Page 628, which states:
"Where a lease provides that the tenant may at his option
have an extension for a specified time after the expiration
of the term of the lease, or may occupy for an extended
term, including that specified in the lease, the mere
holdover after the expiration of the specified time is
generally held to constitute an election to hold for the
additional or extended term, particularly where coupled
with the payment and acceptance, or tender, of the rent
fixed in the option."
In 50 AM. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, Section 1192, it is
noted:
"If the tenant has an option to renew for a specified term,
the holdover, with payment and unconditional acceptance of
rent, will create a tenancy for the specified term, such
acceptance of the rent constituting a waiver of any right
of the landlord to notice of the intention of the tenant to
renew."
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See the many cases cited in support thereof.

See:

27 Am, Jur2d.f

Eminent Domain, Section 250; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bradley, 468
P2d 95 (Ka.); Wessells v. State Department of Highways, 562 P2d
1042.
Written leases frequently contain a "condemnation clause"
which provides that in the event the subject property is taken by
the power of eminent domain, the leasehold interest terminates.
However, such

a provision

in a

lease must be scrutinized

to

determine the true intent of the parties, conditions which must
occur and what action must be taken before the leasehold interest
ceases.

Where

a

lease

may

be

cancelled

in

the

event

of

condemnation at the election of the lessor, the issue of notice to
the tenant becomes of significant import.
Where an "optional termination clause" exists, the right to
share in just compensation exists until an "election" is made
terminating the lease.

See:

96 ALR 2d 1140, 1150.

The leasehold

agreements between the owners and tenants contained a specific
agreement granting the tenants the right and option to renew the
leasehold agreement.

The testimony proffered clearly disclosed

that the tenants did in fact exercise their respective options to
renew their leasehold agreement, and thereafter, the owners, by
their conduct and acguiesence, affirmed and ratified such renewals.
As noted in 27 Am. Jur2d. 23, Section 250:
M* * * where it appears that the lessor has given the
tenant adequate notice of his intention to cancel, the
lease is deemed terminated and the tenant is precluded from
sharing in the lessor's condemnation award. The contrary
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result has been reached, however, where the lessor failed
to properly notify the lessee of termination. It has been
held that the right of a tenant to damages for injury to a
leasehold is not defeated by the fact that under the lease,
the owner may terminate the tenancy on short notice, if the
tenant is able to prove a depreciation in the value of the
leasehold interest."
See:

4 Nichols on Eminent Domain §12.42 [1][3].

The evidence and testimony is unrefuted that the first and
only election to terminate the subject leasehold interests was by
letter dated January 31, 1987. (TR. 68-84) (Ex. 8)

The trial court

made no factual determination on the issue of notice.

It is

undisputed that the owners continued to collect the rent on the
premises from date of condemnation until date of trial, and in all
respects, dealt with the tenants as though the lease agreements
were in full force and effect.
In the case of Garbaldi v. Oklahoma Industrial Finance
Corp., 543 P2d 555, it has been held that absent an agreement to
the contrary the rights of a tenant to share in the award became
vested at the time of the taking.
The condemnation provision in each lease provides:
"In the event said premises, or any part thereof, or the
whole or any part of the said building shall be taken by
right of eminent domain or shall be taken for any street or
public use or the action of public authorities after the
execution and before the termination hereof, this Lease
may, at the election of Lessor or Lessee, be terminated;
provided, however, in such event, Lessee shall be entitled
to compensation for improvements made to said premises, in
an amount equal to the compensation received by Lessor in
respect thereof and as a result thereof, regardless of the
termination of this Lease." (Emphasis added.)
Also, in the case of Standard Parts Co. v. D & J Investment
Co.,

supra, the Court quoted

51 C.J.S., Landlord

Section 77, Page 628, which states:

and Tenant,
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"Where a lease provides that the tenant may at his option
have an extension for a specified time after the expiration
of the term of the lease, or may occupy for an extended
termf including that specified in the leasef the mere
holdover after the expiration of the specified time is
generally held to constitute an election to hold for the
additional or extended term, particularly where coupled
with the payment and acceptance, or tender, of the rent
fixed in the option."
See also Wells v. Blystad, 14 P2d 1078.
As heretofore noted, the "condemnation clause" set forth in
each lease differs from the typical "condemnation clause", which
generally provides that upon the taking of the entire property by
eminent domain, the term of the lease shall come to an end.

As

noted in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 506, under such a
provision, the tenant has no estate or interest in the property
which remains after the taking which would sustain a claim for
compensation.

However, in the instant case we do not find that

type of language.

To the contrary, the "condemnation clause" in

each lease makes the termination optional and gives the remedy to
either the lessor or lessee upon proper notice.

In cases of this

nature a different rule of law seems to apply and in Nichols,
Eminent Domain, supra, it is stated:
"It has been held that the law does not look with favor on
clauses causing forfeiture of the lessee's interest on
condemnation, hence, a lease covenant will be construed not
to have that effect if its language and the circumstances
possibly permit. It has been held also that inquiry may be
had as to the question of conscionability of the clause."
See also Urban Renewal Agency v. Weider's, Inc., 632 P2d
1334, 1359; and, City and County of Honolulu v. Midkiff,
616 P2d 213.
In the case of Urban Renewal Agency v. Weider's, Inc.,
supra, the Court noted:
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"A tenant is generally entitled to share in the
condemnation award made to the landlord to the extent of
the value of the leaseholdf although such a right may be
waived by contractual agreement to the contrary."
The Court further stated:
"We decline to hold that the first sentence in this clause
is sufficient as a matter of law to terminate the lessee's
interest in the remaining term of its leasehold and to
foreclose participation in the lump sum award.
In the
first place, clauses attempting to terminate leasehold
interests are construed in favor of the lessee. Nichols,
Eminent Domain, § 5.23(2) , ( 1979) .
Second, the clause,
unlike that in Highway Com, v. Ore. Investment Co., supra,
does not specifically exclude the lessee from such
participation. A prospective lessee, reading this clause,
might regard it simply as a statement of the legal effect
of a taking (i.e., that the lease agreement becomes
inoperative as between the parties).
As a matter of
policy, therefore, we think it preferable to require that,
if the parties intend that the lessee not share in any
award made as compensation for the taking, that intent
should be specifically spelled out.
We do not hold,
however, that the whole clause must necessarily be read to
mean the opposite, i.e., that the lessee has a right to
participate in the award.
We conclude rather that the
claus is ambiguous and evidence of the intent of the
parties must be sought elsewhere."
Given

the

nature

of

the

"condemnation

clause"

here

involved, we do not believe that the language was of such a clear
and unambiguous nature as to be void of any material issue of fact.
It is generally recognized that where a "condemnation clause" in a
lease of real property possesses a question of fact as to the true
intent or meaning, the trial court should not dispose of an issue
on a motion for summary judgment.

See City and County of Honolulu

v. Midkiff, supra; Amjacs Interwest, Inc., v. Design Associates,
635 P2d 53 (Utah, 1981); and Graham v. Washington Univ., 569 P2d
896 (Ha., 1977).
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The tenants, in this instance, in order to protect their
proprietary interests, were entitled to file an appropriate answer
to

the

Complaint

compensation.

in

condemnation

At the time

and

assert

their

claim

to

the Answer was filed, the initial term

of the lease had not then expired and whether or not a "bonus
factor" then existed in the lease remained a factual issue for
consideration and determination under the circumstances.

In this

case, the trial court, in our judgment and opinion, clearly erred
in construing the condemnation clause of the respective leases as
having the effect of being self executing in the termination of the
leasehold agreements, and the issues raised.
We do not believe that the language in the lease agreements
is so clear as to be self-executing or totally dispositive of the
issue of termination, and does not rise to the level required to
allow a termination of all claims for loss or damage by the lessee
as a matter of law.

See Urban Renewal Agency v. Weider's, supra.

A restriction by the trial court to allow the tenants a right to
address the value of "improvements" only is completely contrary to
the law of eminent domain.

Improvements, if any, could only be

significant to the extent that they were part of the realty and
could be considered by the appraisers only for that purpose, if
any.

The method to be applied in apportioning the total award is

to ascertain the extent of the "bonus value" of each lease, if any,
and allocate such amount to the lessee and the balance to the
lessor.

See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain §12.42 [3]; Utah State

Road Commission v. Brown, supra.
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POINT II
BASED UPON THE PLEADINGS AND CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED
HEREIN, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO THE OWNERS AND AGAINST THE TENANTS.
Both owner and tenant on the issue of attorney's fees are
defendants

in the same case.

Plaintiff maintains that it is

entitled to condemn the subject property and make payment in a
claimed

amount

defendants

amongst

individually

property.

No

the

named

defendants.

responded, claiming

cross-pleading

took

place

Each

of

the

an interest in the
between

individual

defendants, but all of the defendants competed for the same pot of
money.
It is well settled that a party who deems a contract to be
void for one purpose, cannot subsequently rely upon that contract
to support another purpose.
(1972).

BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P2d 456

Either a contract is valid and binding as between the

parties, or does not exist.
contract

had

terminates

the

ceased

to

The ruling of the trial court that the
exist,

contractual

if

sustained

relationships

by

between

this

Court,

the parties,

including the provisions for attorney's fees.
It is axiomatic that before a claim may be sustained in
favor

of

one party

against

another, it must be founded upon

pleading and a prayer for relief.

Rule 13(f), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides:
"(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as
a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein relating to any property that is the
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subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim
may include a claim that the party against whom it is
asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all
or part of a claim asserted in the action against the
cross-claimant."
Tenants

timely

objected

to owner's

Motion

Judgment as not founded upon any proper pleading.

for

Summary

This was never

corrected prior to trial, although language was contained in the
Findings and Conclusions that purport to conform the pleadings to
the evidence.

URCP Rule 15(b).

Said Rule is not applicable in the

instant case.

Tenants did not consent to trial without pleadings.

The Rule was not designed or contemplated to allow permissive cross
claims or counterclaims after the fact, and the issue of attorney's
fees was not new at trial, but raised in owner's Motion for Summary
Judgment and objected to at that time based on improper pleading.
The trial court ruled at that time no additional pleading was
necessary.

Any attempt to correct this ruling post trial would

constitute an abuse of discretion.
The peripheral

claim of the owners was never properly

plead, and in our opinion, was never properly before the trial
court in the condemnation action.

See: General Ins. Co. of Am. v.

Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P2d 202 (1976).
In

support

of

its

award

for

attorney's

fees,

owners

submitted an affidavit on behalf of counsel, which made a claim for
a fee in a range and outlined certain documents that were prepared.
The

affidavit

is

insufficient

on

its

face

for

the award of

attorney's fees in that it does not provide a detailed specific
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accounting of time spentf provides no justification for the hourly
rate expended by counsel, provides no support that the amount of
time expended
difficulty,

was consistent

and

nature

of

and appropriate

the

issues

for the novelty,

presented.

Cabrera

v.

Cottrell, 694 P2d 622 (1985); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P2d 100
(1983); Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P2d 743
(1982) .
CONCLUSION
Due to the ambiguity in the "condemnation clause" of each
lease, the continued collection and receipt of rentals, the absence
of any unconditional Order of Immediate Occupancy, and the failure
of the owners to give notice of their election to terminate the
lease agreements until shortly prior to trial present a scenario
which, in our opinion, precludes the granting of summary judgment
as a matter of law relative to the rights of the tenants to
participate in a complete evidentiary hearing on the issues of
just

compensation

and

compensable

interests

in

the

subject

property.
The tenants were, in our opinion, entirely justified in
filing an appropriate answer to the Complaint served upon them and
were further
necessary

entitled

evidence

and

to develop and present to the jury the
testimony

to

support

their

claims and

contentions that each leasehold interest had a "bonus value" and
upon an appropriate finding to that effect would have been entitled
to share or otherwise participate in the award for damages rendered
in this cause.

The ruling of the trial court that the mere filing
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of the action served to dispose of or otherwise terminate the
leasehold interests as a matter of law is not consistent with the
prevailing law, or otherwise supported by the evidence proffered.
Based upon the authorities and facts set forth hereinabove,
we do not believe there exists any reasonable or other basis upon
which the trial court should have awarded attorney's fees against
the tenants simply because they sought to partipate in the judicial
process of having a jury make a determination relative to the
extent of their interests in said properties and the amount of
compensation, if any, to which they were entitled.

Clearly such a

ruling constituted reversible error.
Based

upon

the

authorities

cited

hereinabove,

we

respectfully urge that the ruling and judgment of the trial court
be reversed, that the cause be remanded for appropriate proceedings
on the issue of damages, and that these Appellants be awarded their
costs, attorney's fees, and such further and additional relief as
this Court may deem appropriate and just in the premises.
DATED this

day of January, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
BRANT H. WALL
JEROME H. MOONEY, III

BY
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellants Daskalas, Pentelakis, and The Pawn
Shop were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following named persons
this

day of January, 1988.
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 No. University Ave., #200
Provo, Utah 84604
William D. Oswald
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 45450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
John T. Evans
Attorney for Defendants Barrows
310 South Main, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
B. Ray Zoll
Attorney at Law
5251 South Green Street, #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Jerome H. Mooney, III
Attorney for Defendants Daskalas,
Pentelakis and The Pawn Shop
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

BRANT H. WALL
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ADDENDUM

LEASE

THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE made and entered into as
of the

1st

day of

August

19

81

by and

between BEATRICE BARROTS, ROBERT G. BARROWS, AND JUNE BURGE, all
individuals of Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as
'LESSOR,1' and

Terry Pantelakis dba

AAA Jewelry 6c Loans

f

hereinafter referred to as

'LESSEE;"
WITNESSETH :

That in consideration of the rental, covenants and
agreements herein reserved and contained on the part of the
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby
lease, demise and l e t unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as:
64 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

10 HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of
Five
19

(5) years beginning the

1st

day of

81 .
Lessee shall pay Lessor the sum of $

payable at the rate of $

400.00

1st

period of

(60) months, commencing

81 .

Sixty

4,800.00

per month, monthly in

advance, on the

19

August

day of each and every month for a
August 1

,

- 2 Notices, payments and other carrmnications herein
provided or hereby contemplated shall be considered duly delivered
when mailed by either registered

or ordinary first-class mail,

postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and to Lessee at

66 East and Second South, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84111

Ihis Lease shall not be assigned, and neither said
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned,
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and this
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so determine and elect.

Should Lessee sublet the whole or any part of

said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance of rent
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be
deemed a waiver of the breach, but the same shall be a continuing
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy continues.
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee.

Lessor

shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage

- 3 to person or property in or about said premises or such building
resulting from electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or
gas, unless caused by

or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents,

servants or employees.

Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages

to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by
Lessor that such defects or damages exist.
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use
of said premises.
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent
(40%) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof,
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused,
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial restoration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-one (91) days
following the date the damage occurred.

If this Lease is not so

terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation.

No

compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing
any portion of said premises or the said building however such
necessity may occur.

- 4 In the event said premises,"or any part thereof, or
the vhole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right
of eminent domain or shall be "taken for any street or public use
or the action of p\:blic authorities after the execution and before
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor
or Lessee, be terminated; -provided, however, in such event, Lessee
shalUrbe-entitled to compensation for iapruvements made to said
premises7 -in~an> amount equal -to the compensation received by Lessor
in respect-thereof and as a* result thereof, regardless of the termination of this Lease.
Ihtry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satisfactory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be
placed by Lessor. Lessee shall care for said premises and cure
any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents,
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrender said
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable
use thereof will permit. Lessee shall make no alterations or
iuprovements of or additions to said premises without the prior
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease.

- 5 It is hereby agreed that if Lessee shall default in
making any or all rental payments, keeping any or all terms, conditions or covenants of this Lease, abandon said premises, become
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after five (5) days, written
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default, re-enter upon
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this
Lease as to all future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Lessee covenants and agrees that in

case of termination accomplished pursuant to provisions of this
paragraph, Lessee will indemnify Lessor against all loss of rents
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor would
have been entitled to receive under the terms and provisions of
this Lease, and also against all attorney's fees and expenses incurred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of
this Lease.
No-holding-over by Lessee,- however- long--continued,
shall operate to renew**or extend~this Lease without Lessor's
written,<consent.

If Lessee tolds possession of said premises

after the term of this Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee
shall become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in
the last installment during the last month of the term of this
Lease, and upon the terms herein specified, and shall continue to
be such tenant until the tenancy shall be terminated by Lessor
or until Lessee shall have given Lessor a written notice of at
least one (1) xnsnth of Lessee's intention to terminate the tenancy.

Lessor shall furnish such heating as may be required
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition

- 6 Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and
Lessee shall also pay all plumbing bills and electric ligjit
charges.

Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees

and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the terms and provisions of this Lease.
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including plate
window glass upon said premises.

In the event of any breakage,

Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of
same.
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against
said liability in a sun of not less than $100,000/?300,000, a copy
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution
of this Lease Agreement.
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional
yearly rent, in and above the real property taxes assessed

on

said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year

^81

Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year
^-986 , and thereafter during the term of this Lease.
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and
agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upon the heirs,
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties
hereto.
In the event, however, that, at any time during the
term hereof, Lessor shall receive from any third party a bona fide
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acceptable
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter

- 7in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terms. If
Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third party making
the offer on the same terms .and condiditons set forth in such
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate.
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the
dissolution of Lessor*s interests as herein stated, for nominal
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no rigjit to purchase
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance.
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any time
located thereon free and clear of any and all mechanics, materialmens, and other liens for or arising out of or in connection with
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and
at all times proqptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto. Lessee shall give

- 8Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance
of the commencement of any construction, alterations, addition,
improvement or repair estimated to cost in eyuaess of $ 1,000.00
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor's
non-responsibility.
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall
notify Lessor of its intention to do so witidn five (5) days
after the filing of such lien.

In such case, and provided that

Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or
damage arising out of such, contest, Lessee shall not be in default hereunder until ten (10) days after the final extermination
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder.
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and indemnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this
Lease for- a period of - Five

(5) years" after^the* expiration of

the term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, with all
other terms and conditionf; of the renewal lease to be the same as
those herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor
written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days
before this lease expires.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Indenture as of the date first above set forth.

LESSOR:

LESSEE:
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS

>r J2.. .

r

tuX^

(Including Title)

t t**(a£>t 6< t<-v
**t\rjc
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LEAS E

THIS HCOTTURE OF LEASE made and entered Into as
of the

1st

day of

August

, 19

31

by and

between BEATRICE BAKRCWS, ROBERT G. BARRCWS, AND JUNE 3UKZ, a l l
individuals of Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as
"LESSOR," and

Ellen K. Daskalas dba

The Pawn Shop

f

hereinafter referred to as

"LESSEE,"
W I T N E S S E T H :
That in consideration of the rental, covenants and
agreements herein reserved and contained on the part of the
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby
lease, demise and let unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as:

66 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

10 HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of
Five
19

(5) years beginning the

1st

day of August

81 .
Lessee shall pay Lessor the sum of $

payable at the rate of $
advance, on the
period of
19

81 .

Sixty

1st

450.00

5,400.00

per month, monthly in

day of each and every month for a

(60) months, commencing

August 1

,

- 2 Notices, payments and other corrmjnications herein
provided or hereby contemplated shall be considered duly delivered
when mailed by either registered

or ordinary first-class mail,

postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and to Lessee at
City, Utah 84111

66 East and Second South, Salt Lake
.

Ibis lease shall not be assigned, and neither said
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned,
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and this
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so determine and elect.

Should Lessee sublet the whole or any part of

said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance of rent
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be
deemed a waiver of the breach, but the same shall be a continuing
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy continues.
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee.

Lessor

shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage

- 3 to person or property in or about said premises or such building
resulting frcm electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or
gas, unless caused by

or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents,

servants or employees.

Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages

to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by
Lessor that such defects or damages exist.
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use
of said premises.
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent
(40%) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof,
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused,
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial restoration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-cne (91) days
following the date the damage occurred.

If this Lease is not so

terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation.

No

compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing
any portion of said premises or the said building however such
necessity may occur.

- 4 In the event said premises, or any part thereof, or
the whole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right
of eminent domain or shall be taken for any street or public use
or the action of public authorities after the execution and before
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor
or Lessee, be terminated; provided, however, in such event, Lessee
shall be entitled to compensation for improvements made to said
premises, in an amount equal to the compensation received by Lessor
in respect thereof and as a result thereof, regardless of the termination of this Lease.
Entry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satisfactory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be
placed by Lessor. Lessee shall care for said premises and cure
any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents,
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrender said
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable
use thereof will permit. Lessee shall make no alterations or
improvements of or additions to said premises without the prior
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease.

- 5 It is hereby agreed that if Lessee shall default in
making any or all rental payments, keeping any or all terms, conditions or covenants of this Lease, abandon said premises, become
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after five (5) days, written
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default, re-enter upon
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this
Lease as to all future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Lessee covenants and agrees that in

case of teimination accomplished pursuant to provisions of this
paragraph, Lessee will indemnify Lessor against all loss of rents
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor would
have been entitled to receive under the terms and provisions of
this Lease, and also against all attorney's fees and expenses incurred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of
this Lease.

No holding over by Lessee, however long continued,
shall operate to renew or extend this Lease without Lessor's
written consent.

If Lessee holds possession of said premises

after the term of this Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee
shall become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in
the last installment during the last month of the term of this
Lease, and upon the terms herein specified, and shall continue to
be such tenant until the tenancy shall be terminated by Lessor
or until Lessee shall have given Lessor a written notice of at
least one (1) month of Lessee's intention to terminate the tenancy.

Lessor shall furnish such heating as may be required
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition

- 6 Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and
Lessee shall also pay all plurbing bills and electric ligfrt
charges. Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees
and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the terms and provisions of this Lease.
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including plate
window glass upon said premises.

In the event of any breakage,

Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of
same.
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against
said liability in a sum of not less than $100, (XXV $300,000, a copy
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution
of this Lease Agreement.
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional
yearly rent, in and above the real property taxes assessed on
said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year

^81

Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year
^ ° " , and thereafter during the term of this Lease.
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and
agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upon the heirs,
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties
hereto.
In the event, however, that, at any time during the
term hereof, Lessor shall receive from any third party a bona fide
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acceptable
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter

- 7 in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terms.

If

Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third party making
the offer on the same terms and condiditons set forth in such
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate.
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the
dissolution of Lessor's interests as herein stated, for nominal
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no right to purchase
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance.
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any time
located therecn free and clear of any and all mechanics, materialmens, and other liens for or arising out of or in connection with
work or labor done, services

performed, or materials or appliances

used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and
at all times promptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto.

Lessee shall give

- 8 Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance
of the comnencement of any construction, alterations, addition,
iirprovement or repair estimated to cost in excess of $ 1,000.00
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor's
non-responsibility.
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall
notify Lessor of its intention to do so within five (5) days
after the filing of such lien.

In such case, and provided that

Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or
damage arising out of such contest, Lessee shall not be in default hereunder until ten (10) days after the final determination
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder.
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and indemnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this
Lease for a period of

Five

(5) years after the expiration of

the- term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least
sixty (60) days prior to the expiraticn of this Lease, with all
other terms and conditions of the renewal lease to be the same as
those herein.

To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor

written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days
before this lease expires.

- 9IN WITNESS VHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Indenture as of the date first above set forth.

LESSEE:

LESSOR:
/*

THE PAWN SHOP

n

j-

S

By > ^ V > . ., „
JL<£^*<J*<^
(Including Title)

ATTEST:

y^u u,frJ~L^•
(Including Title) ^ ,, - j - n - J i -

C<. ^
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